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1 Introduction
The privatization of state-owned public enterprises has been a global phenomenon for more than 50
years. Nevertheless, many public enterprises that have significant government ownership are still active
in strategic industries and control large portions of the world’s resources. According to an OECD report
by Kowalski et al. (2013), public enterprises account for more than 10% of the 2000 largest companies in
the world and their sales are equivalent to approximately 6% of global GDP. They are significant players
in OECD countries in such industries as transportation, telecommunications, energy, and finance. In
planned and transitional countries, the presence of public enterprises is further significant (Chen, 2017;
Dong et al., 2018; Fridman, 2018).
One classical rationale for public enterprises is to prevent private monopolies in natural monopoly
markets in which significant economies of scale prevail. Thus, many public enterprises existed or still
exist in such national monopoly markets. However, because of technological improvements, many mar-
kets in which public enterprises exist are not always characterized by significant economies of scale.
Indeed, a considerable number of public enterprises compete with private enterprises in a wide range
of industries (mixed oligopolies).1 The optimal privatization policies in these mixed oligopolies have
attracted extensive attention from economics researchers in such fields as industrial organization, pub-
lic economics, financial economics, and development economics.2 Owing to recent deregulation and
liberalization, entry restrictions in mixed oligopolies have significantly weakened. As a result, private
enterprises have newly entered many mixed oligopolies, such as the banking, insurance, telecommu-
nications, energy, and transportation industries. The literature on mixed oligopolies has intensively
investigated optimal privatization policy in free-entry markets. For example, by using a monopolistic
competition framework, Anderson et al. (1997) showed that privatization may improve welfare when
private competitors are domestic, and Matsumura et al. (2009) showed that privatization is more likely
to improve welfare when private enterprises are foreign. Matsumura and Kanda (2005) adopted the
1Examples include United States Postal Service, Deutsche Post AG, Areva, Nippon Telecom and Telecommunication,
Japan Tobacco, Volkswagen, Renault, Electricite de France, Japan Postal Bank, Kampo, Korea Development Bank, and
Korea Investment Corporation.
2For examples of mixed oligopolies and recent developments in this field, see Ishida and Matsushima (2009), Colombo
(2016), Chen (2017), and the works cited therein.
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partial privatization approach formulated by Matsumura (1998) and showed that the optimal degree of
privatization is zero when private competitors are domestic, while Cato and Matsumura (2012) showed
that it is strictly positive when private competitors are foreign and that this is increasing in the foreign
ownership share in private firms. Chen (2017) revisited the problem by introducing the cost-reducing
effect of privatization. Fujiwara (2007) found a non-monotonic (monotonic) relationship between the
degree of product differentiation and optimal degree of privatization in a non-free entry (free-entry)
market. Cato and Matsumura (2015) discussed the relationship between optimal trade and privatiza-
tion policies and showed that a higher tariff rate reduces the optimal degree of privatization and that
the optimal tariff rate can be negative. Cato and Matsumura (2013) showed the privatization neutrality
theorem originally discussed by White (1996) in a duopoly in a non-free entry market. These studies
assumed that the government chooses its privatization policies before the entry of private enterprises.
Recently, an alternative timeline has been adopted by several works (Xu et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2018)
for analyzing free-entry markets. These studies have investigated cases in which the government chooses
its privatization policies after the entry of private enterprises and have showed that the optimal degree
of privatization depends on the timing of privatization.
However, all of these studies have assumed that the government chooses the degree of privatize only
once. In reality, the government often changes the degree of privatization over time. For example, the
Japanese government announced the sale of some of the government’s share in Nippon Telecom and
Telecommunication (NTT) when the telecommunication market opened up in 1985, and the government
reduced its ownership of NTT gradually over 30 years. Japan Post, which owns part of Postal Bank, the
largest bank in Japan, was first privatized in 2015; the government sold some shares in 2017, and plans
to sell further shares in the future. The Japanese government first sold shares in Japan Tobacco (JT)
in 1994, again in 1996, and last in 2004. In Japan, the government has rarely increased its ownership
of partially privatized enterprises except when they have faced financial problems. However, this is
not always the case in other countries. For example, the French government increased its ownership
of Renault from 15% to 19.4% in 2015. All these examples suggest that the assumption that the
government decides the degree of privatization only once might be restrictive.
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In this study, we consider a model in which the government privatizes the public firm before the
entry of private firms, and then it adjusts the degree of privatization after the entry. In other words,
the government cannot commit not to adjust the degree of privatization after the entry.3 We introduce
the shadow cost of public funding4 and showed that a pre-entry privatization policy may serve as a
commitment device to mitigate the time-inconsistency problem in the pro-entry privatization policy.
There is a time-inconsistency problem when the government cannot commit not to adjust the degree
of privatization after the entry. More aggressive behavior of the public firm restricts the entry of private
firms, resulting in the reduction of private firms, which might improve welfare. Keeping the public firm
more aggressive, the government holds more shares than the static optimal share. After the entry
of the private firms, the government might have a stronger incentive to make the public firm less
aggressive, because it induces welfare-improving production substitution from the public firms to the
private firms (Matsumura, 1998).5 Therefore, the government chooses a larger degree of privatization
after the entry. Expecting this change of privatization policy after the entry, more private firms enter
the market, resulting in welfare loss.
If there is no shadow cost of public funding, the privatization policy before the entry is useless,
because the government can freely adjust the degree of privatization after the entry with or without
a pre-entry privatization policy without costs. However, in the presence of the shadow cost of public
funding, a pre-entry privatization policy affects the government’s incentive after the entry. If the
government sells shares in the public firm before the entry, the government only partially reduces the
shadow cost of public funding by increasing the public firm’s profit at the post-entry stage. Therefore,
the government’s behavior after the entry is distorted by the pre-entry privatization policy. This
3The government may commit not to reduce public ownership in the future by enacting a law with a minimal public
ownership share obligation. For example, by law, the Japanese government must hold more than one-third of the shares
in NTT and JT. However, it was mandatory for the Japanese government to hold a two-thirds share in JT until 2012,
which was subsequently reduced to one-third. Because the government can change the law, it is difficult to implement a
commitment not to change the public ownership share in the future.
4The shadow cost of public funds is quite popular in many fields of economics. Meade (1944) undertook pioneering
work, which was developed in Laffont and Tirole (1986). Instead, we can interpret The shadow cost of public funds as a
coefficient of the budget constraint (the larger the shadow cost of public funds is, the more sever the budget constraint
is). We discuss this point in Section 2.
5For an excellent discussion on welfare-improving production substitution in general contexts, see Lahiri and Ono
(1988).
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distortion might mitigate the abovementioned time-inconsistency problem. We investigate under what
conditions this distortion in fact mitigates this problem. We find that the government improves welfare
by the pre-entry privatization policy, unless the foreign ownership share in the private firms is close to
zero or one.
Sato and Matsumura’s (2018) study is closely related to the present study. They formulated a
two-period model in which government chooses the degree of privatization in the first period and then
adjusts it in the second period. Sato and Matsumura (2018) showed that the government chooses a
smaller degree of privatization than the optimal one so as not to distort the second-period privatization
policy. This study is different from theirs in three important aspects. First, Sato and Matsumura (2018)
assumed that the number of firms is given exogenously and is not affected by privatization policies (i.e.,
the authors did not consider a free-entry market). Second, in this study the government may choose
a larger degree of privatization in an early stage than the optimal one, which never appears in Sato
and Matsumura (2018). Third, in this study, the government strategically distorts future privatization
policy by the initial privatization policy to improve welfare, whereas the distortion of privatization
policy always reduces future welfare in Sato and Matsumura (2018). In other words, an early-stage
privatization has contrasting welfare implications in free-entry markets.
2 Model
There are three types of players in the game, a government, a state-owned public enterprise, and private
firms as potential entrants. Before the game, the government holds all the shares of the public enterprise
and sells a part of the shares in a perfect financial market. Observing the share of the public enterprise
sold, private enterprises simultaneously decide whether to enter the market. Being unable to commit to
the initial privatization policy, the government again sells (or buys back) a share of the public enterprise
after observing the entry. Finally, the public enterprise and private enterprises compete in quantities.
The government sells αB shares before the entry of private firms and αA − αB shares after the
entry of private firms. We assume that the investors of firm 0 are domestic.6 αB and αA are measures
6The assumption that the investors in privatized firms are domestic is standard in the literature (Cato and Matsumura,
2012; Xu et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2018), and might be realistic. For example, the foreign ownership share in Postal Bank
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of the degree of privatization before and after the entry of private firms, respectively. If αA−αB < 0,
this implies that the government buys back the shares in firm 0 and renationalizes it.
Let W denote domestic welfare and pii denote firm i’s profit. Following the standard formulation in
the literature on mixed oligopolies formulated by Matsumura (1998), we assume that firm 0 maximizes
the weighted average of social welfare and its own profit, and that the weight depends on the degree
of privatization after the entry αA, whereas private firms maximize their own profits. Specifically, we
assume that firm 0 maximizes (1− αA)W + αApi0.
Firms produce perfectly substitutable commodities for which the inverse demand function is denoted
by p = p(Q) = a−Q, where p is the price and Q is the total output. We assume that a is sufficiently large
for some private firms to enter the market in equilibrium. Firm 0’s cost function is c0(q0) = q
2
0/2 +K0,
where q0 is the output of firm 0. Each private firm i (= 1, . . . , n) has an identical cost function,
c(qi) = q
2
i /2 +K, where qi is the output of private firm i and c(qi) is the cost.
The profit of firm 0 is given by pi0 = p(Q)q0 − c0(q0) and that of firm i (= 1, . . . , n) by pii =
p(Q)qi − c(qi). Domestic welfare is defined as
W =
∫ Q
0
p(q)dq − p(Q)Q+ pi0 + (1− θ)
n∑
i=1
pii + λ(D +RB +RA), (1)
where λ > 0 is the additional social cost of public funding,7 D is the revenue from firm 0’s dividends,
RB and RA are the revenue from privatization before and after the entry, respectively, and θ is the
foreign ownership share in private firms. Private firms are foreign (domestic) when θ = 1 (θ = 0).8 The
social cost of public funding is the deadweight loss from collecting a unit of tax (i.e., the excess burden
of taxation). Instead, we can interpret λ as a coefficient of the budget constraint (the larger λ is, the
more severe the budget constraint is). Thus, the government’s revenue from firm 0 yields a λ welfare
gain, because it saves the excess burden of taxation in other markets or relaxes the budget constraint.9
among private ownership is about one-fifth of the Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group. If the investors of firm 0 are foreign,
the time-inconsistency problem discussed below becomes more serious, and the government more likely uses pre-entry
privatization policy. For discussions on foreign investors for privatized firms in a non-free entry model, see Lin and
Matsumura (2012).
7(1 + λ) is the so-called marginal cost of public funding.
8For discussions on the nationality of private enterprises in mixed oligopolies, see the literature starting with Corneo
and Jeanne (1994) and Fjell and Pal (1996). See also Pal and White (1998), Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005a, 2005b),
Lin and Matsumura (2012), and Xu et al. (2016).
9See Matsumura and Tomaru (2013). Introducing the shadow cost of public funding λ is popular in many contexts, as
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We assume that λ < 1 for the tractability of our analysis.10
We assume that the financial market is perfect. In other words, the government sells its shares in
firm 0 at the fair value of the firm. The fair value of firm 0, V , is equal to pi0. Therefore, before (after)
the entry of private firms, the government obtains RB = αBV (RA = (αA−αB)V ). In addition, at the
end of the game, the government obtains D = (1− αA)pi0.
The timeline of our model is as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses αB ∈ [0, 1].
In the second stage, each private firm decides whether to enter the market. In the third stage, the
government chooses αA ∈ [0, 1]. In the fourth stage, each firm simultaneously chooses qi. We adopt
subgame-perfect equilibrium as a solution concept.
3 Equilibrium
We solve the game by backward induction. In the last stage, each firm chooses its output simultaneously.
Note that at the competition stage, the government has already sold firm 0’s shares. Therefore, when
firm 0 chooses q0, RB and RA are given exogenously. Firm 0 maximizes (1 − αA)W + αApi0. By
substituting D = (1− αA)pi0 into (1), we obtain the payoff of firm 0. The first-order condition of firm
0 is
(1 + (1−αA)2λ)p+ (1− (1−αA)(1− θ) + (1−αA)2λ)p′q0− (1 + (1−αA)2λ)c′0− (1−αA)θp′Q = 0. (2)
The first-order condition of private firm i (i = 1, . . . , n) is
p+ p′qi − c′ = 0. (3)
Henceforth, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium wherein all private firms produce the same
output level q (i.e., qi = qj = q for all i, j = 1, . . . , n). Solving equations (2), (3), and the following
equation (4) leads to the equilibrium outputs in the fourth stage, given αA and n:
Q = q0 + nq. (4)
used by studies listed in footnote 2, and is also popular in mixed oligopolies. See Capuano and De Feo (2010), Matsumura
and Tomaru (2015), and Xu et al. (2016).
10According to Laffont (2005), λ is estimated to be around 0.3 in developed countries.
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Let qF0 (αA, n), q
F (αA, n), and Q
F (αA, n) := q
F
0 (αA, n) + nq
F (αA, n) be the equilibrium output of firm
0, that of each private firm, and the equilibrium total output in the third stage subgame (given αA and
n), respectively. The superscript F indicates the fourth-stage subgame.
Lemma 1 qF0 (αA, n) and Q
F (αA, n) are decreasing in αA, and q
F (αA, n) is increasing in αA.
Lemma 1 is intuitive and indicates the standard results in the literature. Thus, we omit the formal
proof. A decrease in αA makes the public firm, firm 0, more aggressive, because it is more concerned
about the consumer surplus. Although the objective of each private firm is not related to αA, a decrease
in αA reduces the output of each private firm through the strategic interaction. Note that private firms’
strategies are strategic substitutes. Then, the first direct effect dominates the second indirect strategic
effect and thus, a decrease in αA increases the total output.
After the entry of private firms, the government chooses αA to maximize W given αB (and thus,
given RB). By substituting RA = (αA−αB)pi0 and D = (1−αA)pi0, we obtain the following first-order
condition for the interior solution:
dW
dαA
=
( dqF0
dαA
)
(−p′QF + (1 + λ)(p+ p′qF0 − c′0) + (1− θ)np′qF )
+n
( dqF
dαA
)
(−θ(p′QF − p′qF0 )− (1− θ)p′qF + λp′qF0 )
−λαB
(
dqF0
dαA
(
p+ p′qF0 − c′0
)
+ n
dqF
dαA
p′qF0
)
= 0. (5)
From (5), we observe that the equilibrium αA of this subgame depends on αB. Let α
T
A(αB, n) be the
equilibrium degree of privatization after the entry of private firms (the superscript T indicates the
third-stage subgame).
Anticipating the value of αA, private firms enter up to the point at which they obtain zero profit,
that is,
p(Q)q − c(q)−K = 0. (6)
Let αSA(αB) = α
T
A(αB, n
S(αB)), n
S(αB), q
S(αB) = q(α
S
A(αB)), Q
S(αB) = Q(α
S
A(αB), n
S(αB)), and
qS0 (αB) = q0(α
S
A(αB), n
S(αB)) be the equilibrium degree of privatization, the number of private firms
entering to the market, the output of each private firm, the total output, and the output of firm 0,
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respectively, given αB (the superscript S indicates the second-stage subgame).
Lemma 2 QS(αB) and q
S(αB) do not depend on αB, λ and θ.
A change of αB affects αA and thus, it affects the behavior of firm 0. A change in λ or θ also affects
the behavior of firm 0. If a change of these variables makes firm 0 more (less) aggressive, residual
demand of each private firm shrinks (expands), resulting in a decrease (increase) of the number of
entering firms. However, this change does not affect the equilibrium output of each private firm, and
thus, does not affect the price. This result is also shown in the literature in various contexts and we
omit the proof.11
Finally, the government chooses αB anticipating the firm entry, future privatization, and market
competition. Using Lemma 2 and the zero profit condition, we obtain the first-order condition with
respect to αB as
dW
dαB
=
dqS0
dαB
(
(1 + λ)(p(QS)− c′0(qS0 (αB))
)
= 0 (7)
for the interior solution. For the corner solution, dW/dαB|αB=0 ≤ 0 and dW/dαB|αB=1 ≥ 0.
Let the superscript E denote the equilibrium outcome of the full game. Let αEB(θ), q
E
0 (θ), and n
E(θ)
be the equilibrium degree of privatization, the output of firm 0, and the number of private firms given
θ, respectively.
4 Results
Before discussing the characterization of αB and αA, we discuss two cases as benchmarks. One is the
case wherein the government chooses the degree of privatization only before the entry of the private
firms (privatization-then-entry model). The other is the case wherein the government chooses the
degree of privatization only after the entry of the private firms (entry-then-privatization model). Let
the superscript * (**) denote the equilibrium value of the privatization-then-entry model (entry-then-
privatization model). It is known that the equilibrium degree of privatization in the privatization-then-
11See Matsumura and Kanda (2005), Cato and Matsumura (2012), and Chen (2017).
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entry model, α∗ is efficient for welfare.12 We can show that α∗ is derived from the following system of
equations.13
pE = c′0(q
∗
0),
QE = n∗qE + q∗0,
q∗0 = q0(α
∗, n∗),
(8)
where pE , qE , and QE are common equilibrium price, outputs of private firms, and total output,
respectively, among privatization-then-entry, entry-then privatization, and flexible privatization models.
Because α∗∗ is the equilibrium degree of privatization when there is no pre-entry privatization, we
obtain α∗∗ = αSA(0).
We now compare the equilibrium levels of privatization-then-entry and entry-then-privatization
models.
Lemma 3 There exists θc such that α
∗ > (=, <) α∗∗ if and only if θ < (=, >) θc.
Proof See the Appendix.
Lee et al. (2018) have already shown this result when λ = 0. Lemma 3 states that this result holds
regardless of λ. When θ = θc, α
∗ = α∗∗. In other words, in the entry-then-privatization model, the
equilibrium price is equal to firm 0’s marginal cost when θ = θc.
Let
θd :=
(n∗∗)2 − 8
3n∗∗(n∗∗ + 4)
.
We now discuss the property of αA(αB). We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) αSA(αB) is increasing in αB if and only if θ < θd. (ii) θd < θc.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 1(i) states that how the initial degree of privatization affects the final degree of pri-
vatization depends on the foreign ownership share in private firms. If the foreign ownership share in
12This is shown by Cato and Matsumura (2012) when λ = 0 and their principle can apply to the case with positive λ.
13See Sato and Matsumura (2017).
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private firms is small (large), an increase in the initial degree of privatization increases (decreases) the
final degree of privatization.
We explain the intuition behind Proposition 1. An increase in αB decreases the weight of pi0 in the
government’s payoff in the subsequent stage.
Suppose that θ is small. An increase in αA makes firm 0 less aggressive, which improves welfare
through welfare-improving production substitution from firm 0 to private firms at the cost of the
reduction of pi0 (Matsumura, 1998). Therefore, the government chooses larger αA when αB is larger.
Suppose that θ is large. A decrease in αA makes firm 0 more aggressive, which improves welfare
because it reduces the outflow of profits to foreign investors, at the cost of the reduction of pi0. Therefore,
the government chooses smaller αA when αB is larger.
From these discussions, we observe that when θ < θd (θ > θd), a decrease (an increase) in α
∗∗
increases pi0 in the entry-then-privatization model. In other words, when θ < θd (θ > θd), α
∗∗ is too
large (small) for the resulting public firm’s profit-maximization in the entry-then-privatization model.
As discussed earlier in this section, when θ = θc, the public firm’s marginal cost is equal to the price
in the entry-then-privatization model. Because marginal cost pricing by the public firm is too aggressive
for the profit-maximizing level, a marginal increase of α from α = α∗∗ increases the public firm’s profit
in the entry-then-privatization model. This implies that θ > θd holds when θ = θc. Therefore, θc > θd
holds.
We now discuss the property of αEB. To this end, we present an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 4 qS0 (αB) is increasing in αB if and only if θ > θd.
Proof See the Appendix.
Using this lemma, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) For θ ∈ [0, θd] ∪ [θc, 1], αEB = 0. (ii) For θ ∈ (θd, θc), αEB = min{αˆ(θ), 1} > 0, where
αˆ is given by equation c′0(qE0 (αSA(αˆ(θ)))) = p
E .
Proof See the Appendix.
We explain the intuition behind Proposition 2. When θ < θc, the government’s incentives for
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privatization given the number of private firms are too large from the ex-ante (pre-entry) welfare
viewpoint. Thus, decreasing the ex-post incentive for privatization improves welfare. When θ > θd, an
increase in the degree of privatization before the entry decreases the incentive for pro-entry privatization,
which improves welfare. Therefore, the government chooses a strictly positive degree of privatization
before the entry of private firms when θd < θ < θc.
When θ > θc, the government’s incentives for privatization given the number of private firms are too
small from the ex-ante (pre-entry) welfare viewpoint. Thus, increasing the ex-post (pro-entry) incentive
for privatization improves welfare. However, because θ > θd, an increase in αB decreases the incentive
for pro-entry privatization, which reduces welfare. Therefore, the government does not privatize firm 0
before the entry of private firms.
When θ < θd, the government’s incentives for privatization given the number of private firms are
too large from the ex-ante welfare viewpoint because θ < θc. Thus, decreasing the ex-post incentive
for privatization improves welfare. However, an increase in αB increases the incentive for pro-entry
privatization, which reduces welfare. Therefore, the government does not privatize firm 0 before the
entry of private firms.
Figure 1 describes how λ affects θi i = c, d (we set a = 15 and K = 1/2). From Figure 1, we observe
that pre-entry privatization serves as a commitment (i.e., it affects the pro-entry privatization policy)
for relevant range of θ. Note that pre-entry privatization is useful if θ ∈ (θd, θc).14
Figures 2 describes how θ affects αEB and α
∗ (we set a = 15, K = 1/2, and λ = 1/2). From Figure
2, we find that αEB is discontinuous and non-monotone with respect to θ. When θ ≤ θd, αEB = 0
(Proposition 2(i)). When θ exceeds θd, α
E
B jumps to one and remains one when θ is close to θd. When
θ is close to θc, α
E
B is decreasing in θ. Finally, α
E
B again becomes zero when θ reaches θc. Note that
αEA = α
∗∗ when αEB = 0, α
E
A = α
∗ when αEB ∈ (0, 1), and αEA lies between α∗ and α∗∗ when αEB = 1.
We discuss how λ affects θd and θc.
14In 2016, the average foreign ownership share in listed firms in Japan was 30.1%. The foreign ownership share in
KDDI, which competes with partially privatized firm NTT, is 31.7%, while the foreign ownership shares in Mitsubishi
UFJ Financial Group and Mizuho Financial Group, which compete with partially privatized firm Postal Bank and pure
state bank the Development Bank of Japan, were 38.2% and 23.4%, respectively, in 2018.
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Lemma 5 (i) θd does not depend on λ. (ii) θc is increasing in λ.
Proof See the Appendix
Lemma 5 states that pre-entry privatization more likely serves as a commitment when λ is larger.
From Lemma 5, we define the inverse function λc(θ) by λc := θ
−1
c (θ). Proposition 2 and Lemma 5 lead
to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that θ > θd. α
E
B > 0 if and only if λ > λc(θ).
Finally, we compare welfare among three games.
Proposition 4 (i) W ∗ ≥WE ≥W ∗∗. (ii) W ∗ = WE if αEB = αˆ, (iii) WE > W ∗∗ if αEB > 0.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 4(i) implies that if the government commits not to adjust the degree of privatization, it
improves welfare. Proposition 4(ii) states that even if the government could not commit not to adjust
the degree of privatization after the entry of private firms, the optimal initial privatization policy might
substitute the full commitment not to change the degree of privatization. The initial privatization
policy substitutes the full commitment not to change the degree of privatization if the equilibrium
initial privatization policy is partial privatization. Proposition 4(iii) indicates that initial privatization
improves welfare as long as the initial degree of privatization is positive. These results suggest that
the initial privatization policy is welfare improving although it might not yield the best outcome for
welfare.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigate the situation in which the government cannot commit not to adjust the
degree of privatization after the entry of private firms. We find that a privatization policy prior to the
liberalization of the market may substitute the full commitment not to change the privatization policy
and improve welfare. We also show that the optimal degree of privatization prior to the liberalization of
the market is non-monotone with respect to the foreign ownership share in private firms. The optimal
degree of privatization prior to the liberalization of the market is zero when the foreign ownership share
14
in private firms is close to zero and to one, whereas the optimal degree of privatization is positive and
even can be one when the foreign ownership share is intermediate.
In this study, as well as in other studies in the literature on mixed oligopolies, the foreign ownership
share in private firms is given exogenously. Moreover, foreign ownership share does not affect the
efficiency of private firms. Introducing the cost-efficiency effect of foreign ownership and endogenizing
the foreign ownership share is a promising future research topic.
Moreover, we consider a single market model. As Haraguchi et al. (2017) pointed out, public firms
receive competitive pressure from neighboring markets, and extending our analysis to a multi-product
model remains for future research.15
15For discussions of optimal privatization policy in multi-market models, see also Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2017) and
Dong et al. (2018).
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Appendix
Before presenting the formal proofs of lemmas and propositions, we present some properties that are
used in the proofs.
Material for the Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
In all of the privatization-then-entry, entry-then-privatization, and flexible privatization games, Q and
q are determined by the same free-entry condition and the first-order condition for the private firms:
p(Q)q − c(q)−K = 0, (9)
p(Q) + p′(Q)q − c′(q) = 0. (10)
Second, α∗, n∗, and q∗0 is the solution to the following system of equations:
p(Q)− c′0(q∗0) = 0, (11)
q∗0 = q
F (α∗, n∗), (12)
Q = n∗q + q∗0. (13)
Finally, α∗∗, n∗∗, and q∗∗0 equal αSA(0), n
S(0), and qS0 (0), where α
S
A(αB), n
S(αB) and q
S
0 (αB) are
the solution to the following system of equations:
αSA(αB) = α
T
A(αB, n
S(αB)), (14)
Q = nS(αB)q + q
S
0 (αB), (15)
qS0 (αB) = q
F
0 (α
S
A(αB), n
S(αB)). (16)
In addition, in the course of presenting the proofs, we repeatedly use the fact that
∂qF
∂αA
= − 1
n+ 2
∂qF0
∂αA
,
which follows from (3) and (4).
Proof of Lemma 3
We show Lemma 3 in the following steps:
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1. When θ = 0, q∗0 > q∗∗0 :
Let θ = 0. The first-order condition for α∗∗ yields
(1 + λ)(p− c′0) = −p′
[
n
n+ 2
(q + λq0) + q0
]
> 0.
Because pE − c′0(q∗) = 0, pE − c′0(q∗∗) > 0 implies that q∗0 > q∗∗0 at θ = 0.
2. q∗∗0 is increasing in θ:
From the equilibrium conditions (14), (15), and (16) for αB = 0, we obtain
q∗∗0 (θ) =
A−√A2 − 4(1 + λ)B
2(1 + λ)
,
where
A = (1 + λ)(a−Q)− (θ + λ)Q+ (Q+ 2q)[2(1 + λ)− (1− θ)]− (1− θ)q,
B = (Q+ 2q)[(1 + λ)a− (1 + λ− θ)Q]−Q[θQ+ (1− θ)q].
We obtain
∂q∗∗0
∂θ
=
3q
2(1 + λ)
√
A2 − 4(1 + λ)B
(√
A2 − 4(1 + λ)B −A+ 2(1 + λ)Q
)
=
3q
2(1 + λ)
√
A2 − 4(1 + λ)B
(√
A2 − 4(1 + λ)B − (1 + λ)(3a− 4Q) + 3(1− θ)q
)
> 0.
The last inequality follows from
(1 + λ)(3a− 4Q)− 3(1− θ)q = −(1 + λ)a+ 2(5 + 8λ+ θ)
√
2
3
K < 0
for sufficiently large a.
3. q∗∗0 < q∗0 if and only if θ < θc, where θc is derived from
−Q+ (1 + λ)q∗0 + (1− θc)(Q− q∗0)−
Q− q∗0
Q− q∗0 + 2q
(−θc(Q− q∗0)− (1− θc)q + λq0) = 0. (17)
This condition for θc means that the first-order condition for αA(0), (5), is satisfied at q0 = q
∗
0 =
a−Q. This implies q∗0 = q∗∗0 when θ = θc.
Because q∗0 is independent of θ and q∗∗0 is increasing in θ, q∗∗0 < q∗0 if and only if θ < θc.
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4. α∗∗ > α∗ if and only if q∗∗0 < q∗0.
Lemma 4(ii) of Sato and Matsumura (2017) showed that qL0 (α), which solves
qL0 = q
F
0 (α, n
L) (18)
Q = nLq + qL0 (19)
p(Q)q − c(q)−K = 0, (20)
p(Q) + p′(Q)q − c′(q) = 0. (21)
is decreasing in α. In this notation, q∗∗0 = qL0 (α∗∗) and q∗0 = qL0 (α∗), which implies that q∗∗0 < q∗0
if and only if α∗∗ > α∗.
Thus, we obtain that α∗∗ > α∗ if and only if θ < θc, which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1(i)
The proof of Proposition 1(i) proceeds in the following steps:
1. The sign of ∂αSA/∂αB is equal to the sign of ∂α
T
A/∂αB.
2. In the neighborhood of αB = 0 (i.e., α
S
A = α
∗∗, nS = n∗∗, qS0 = q∗∗0 ), ∂αTA/∂αB > (=, <) 0 if
θ < (=, >) θd.
3. If ∂αSA/∂αB > (=, <) 0 in the neighborhood of αB = 0, then ∂α
S
A/∂αB > (=, <) 0 for all
αB > 0, which implies that ∂α
S
A/∂αB > (=, <) 0 if θ < (=, >) θd.
We show each of the steps.
1. First, we show the condition under which αSA(αB) increases with αB.
Differentiating equations (14), (15), and (16), we obtain
∂αSA
∂αB
=
∂αTA
∂αB
+
∂nS
∂αB
∂αTA
∂n
, (22)
0 =
∂nS
∂αB
q +
∂qS0
∂αB
(23)
∂qS0
∂αB
=
∂αSA
∂αB
∂qF0
∂αA
+
∂nS
∂αB
∂qF0
∂n
. (24)
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Equation (23) can be rewritten as
∂nS
∂αB
= −1
q
∂qS0
∂αB
,
and thus, using this equation, equation (24) can be further rewritten as
∂qS0
∂αB
=
∂αSA
∂αB
∂qF0
∂αA
1 + 1q
∂qF0
∂n
.
Substituting these two equations into equation (22), we obtain
∂αSA
∂αB
=
∂αTA
∂αB
1 +
∂αTA
∂n
∂qF0
∂αA
1
q+(∂q0/∂n)
.
A tedious calculation shows that 1+
∂αTA
∂n
∂qF0
∂αA
1
q+(∂q0/∂n)
> 0 in our specification. Thus, ∂αSA/∂αB >
0 if and only if ∂αTA/∂αB > 0.
2. Next, we consider the condition under which ∂αTA/∂αB > 0. Sato and Matsumura (2018) showed
that for fixed number of private firms n, ∂αA/∂αB > 0 if and only if
n2 − 8− 3n(n+ 4)θ > 0.
Let g(θ, αB) =
(
nS(αB, θ)
)2−8−3nS(αB, θ)(nS(αB, θ)+4)θ. At αB = 0, n = n∗∗ = (Q−q∗∗0 )/q,
and g(θ, 0) can be rewritten as
g(θ, 0) =
(
Q− q∗∗0
q
)2
− 8− 3
(
Q− q∗∗0
q
)[(
Q− q∗∗0
q
)
+ 4
]
θ.
Because q∗∗0 is increasing in θ and Q is independent of θ, g(θ, 0) is decreasing in θ. g(θ, 0) = 0
when θ = θd. Thus, we obtain ∂αA/∂αB > 0 at αB = 0 if and only if θ < θd. Note that θd < 1
because g(θ, 0) is continuous and g(1, 0) < 0.
3. Finally, we show that for any αB ∈ [0, 1], αSA increases with αB if and only if θ < θd. Suppose
θ < θd. On the contrary, also suppose that there exists the smallest α¯B > 0 such that α
S
A decreases
with αB at α¯B and α
S
A increases with αB at αB ∈ [0, α¯B). We must have αA(α¯B) > αA(0). Thus,
we must have nS(α¯B) > n
S(0) from equation (15) and the fact that qF0 is decreasing in αB, which
implies that ∂αA/∂αB > 0, which in turn implies that dαA/dαB > 0, a contradiction. The same
principle applies when θ > θd. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1(ii)
Sato and Matsumura (2018) showed that α∗∗ maximizes the profit of firm 0 given the number of private
firms at θ = θd. Therefore, we obtain
∂qF0
∂αA
(p+ p′q0 − c′0) + n
∂qF
∂αB
p′q0 = 0
=⇒ ∂q
F
0
∂αA
(
a−Q− 2q0 + n
n+ 2
q0
)
=
∂qF0
∂αA
(
a−Q− 2q0 + Q− q0
Q− q0 + 2q q0
)
= 0
=⇒ q∗∗0 (θd) =
3a− 2Q−
√
5a2 − 8aQ+ 4Q2
2
, (25)
where we use the first-order condition of the private firms, a−Q−2q = 0 and the fact that ∂qF /∂αA =
−(∂qF0 /∂αA)/(n+ 2).
When θ = θc, p = c
′
0 is satisfied. This implies q
∗∗
0 (θc) = a−Q.
Finally, we obtain
q∗∗0 (θc)− q∗∗0 (θd) =
a+
√
5a2 − 8aQ+ 4Q2
2
> 0,
which implies that θc > θd. Note that we have shown that q
∗∗
0 (θ) is increasing in the proof of Lemma
3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
As seen in the proof of Proposition 1(i), using the equations (23) and (24), we obtain
∂qS0
∂αB
=
∂qF0
∂αA
1 + 1q
∂qF0
∂n
∂αSA
∂αB
.
Because (∂qF0 /∂αA)/(1 + (1/q)(∂q
F
0 /∂n)) < 0 and ∂q
F
0 /∂αA < 0, q
S
0 (αB) increases with αB if and only
if αSA(αB) decreases with αB, which holds if and only if θ > θd (Proposition 1(i)). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
First note that at the first stage, welfare
W =
∫ Q
0
p(x)dx− pQ+ (1 + λ)(pq0 − c0 −K0) + n(pq − c−K) (26)
is affected by αB only through the term
(1 + λ)(p(Q)qS0 (αB)− c0(qS0 (αB))) (27)
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because Q and q are independent of αB. Because c0 is a convex function, this welfare function is concave
in qS0 .
Because qS0 is monotone with respect to αA, αB > 0 if and only if
dW
dαB
∣∣∣∣
αB=0
= (1 + λ)(p− c′0)
∂qS0
∂αB
∣∣∣∣
αB=0
> 0. (28)
Suppose that θ ∈ [0, θd]. Because θd < θc and (p− c′0) > 0 for θ < θc, (1 + λ)(p− c′0) > 0. Lemma 4
yields ∂qS0 /∂αB ≤ 0. Thus, (28) is negative. Suppose that θ ∈ [θc, 1]. Because (p− c′0) > 0 for θ ≥ θc,
(1 + λ)(p− c′0) ≥ 0. Because θd < θc, Lemma 4 yields ∂qS0 /∂αB ≥ 0. Thus, (28) is nonpositive. These
results imply Proposition 2(i).
Suppose that θ ∈ (θd, θc). The above discussions imply that αB > 0. Welfare is maximized when
(1 + λ)(p(Q)qS0 (αB) − c0(qS0 (αB))) is maximized. Because qS0 is increasing in αA and αA ∈ [0, 1], we
obtain Proposition 2(ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
(i) From (25), we obtain q∗∗0 (θd) = (3a − 2Q −
√
5a2 − 8aQ+ 4Q2)/2. Because n∗∗ = (Q − q∗∗0 )/q, θd
is the solution to(
Q− q∗∗0 (θd)
q
)2
− 8− 3
(
Q− q∗∗0 (θd)
q
)[(
Q− q∗∗0 (θd)
q
)
+ 4
]
θd = 0,
where
q∗∗0 (θd) =
3a− 2Q−
√
5a2 − 8aQ+ 4Q2
2
.
Because these equations do not involve λ, θd does not depend on λ.
(ii) Applying the implicit function theorem to the condition for θc (17), we obtain
dθc
dλ
=
2q∗0q
3(Q− q∗0)
> 0.
This implies Lemma 5(ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) W ∗, WE , and W ∗∗ differ only through q0 because Q and q are identical among the three games.
Thus, welfare depends only on (1 +λ)[pq0− c0(q0)] = (1 +λ)piS0 . Because p = pE and does not depends
21
on the resulting q0 in free-entry markets, pi
S
0 is strictly concave with respect to q0 and is maximized
when q0 = q
∗
0.
When θ ∈ [0, θd], qE0 = q∗∗0 ≥ q∗0. When θ ∈ (θd, θc), q∗0 ≥ qE0 > q∗∗0 . When θ ∈ [θc, 1], qE0 = q∗∗0 ≤ q∗0
These results imply that W ∗ ≥WE ≥W ∗∗.
(ii) If αEB = αˆ, we obtain q
E
0 = q
∗, which implies W ∗ = WE .
(iii) When αEB > 0, because q
∗
0 ≥ qE0 > q∗∗0 , WE > W ∗∗ holds. Q.E.D.
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